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OUTER LIMITS:
FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE DOCTRINE OF WASTE
Charles Gass*

I. INTRODUCTION
Directors have a legal obligation to act with care in managing the
business of the corporation. Under Delaware law, the duty has largely
evolved into a process standard. Informed decisions made by independent directors receive judicial deference. Process standards, however, can
sometimes generate irrational results. The doctrine of waste, therefore,
amounts to an outer boundary for decisions otherwise protected by the
business judgment rule.
Although theoretically imposing limits, the doctrine of waste in
practice does little to reign in board decisions. Courts rarely make a finding of waste, even when the asserted benefits are marginal or the
amounts expended appear disproportionate to any benefits received.
“Benefit” has also been interpreted broadly and includes past consideration as well as standard contractual provisions. Further, the courts assess
the challenged amount against the size of the company, dismissing waste
claims for significant payments when made by large public companies.
This approach arises in large part from a judicial gloss that views judges
as ill-suited to analyze the benefits of business decisions and defers to the
judgment of independent directors.
This paper analyzes the application of the doctrine of waste under
Delaware law. Section II discusses the history and the current test for
waste. Section III discusses waste and instances where the issue is
whether the corporation received a benefit. Section IV discusses waste
and instances where the issue is whether the corporation overpaid. Section V explores the effectiveness of the waste doctrine.
II. THE STANDARD FOR WASTE
The duty of care has evolved into a process standard.2 Noting that
proper process can sometimes produce irrational results, the Delaware
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courts recognize that the waste of corporate assets will be actionable
even if shareholders have not rebutted the presumption of the business
judgment rule.3 Waste occurs when an exchange is “so one sided that no
business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the
corporation has received adequate consideration.”4 Waste does not exist
where “there is any substantial consideration received by the corporation, and there is a good faith judgment that in the circumstances the
transaction is worthwhile.”5 Nor will waste occur where the matter turns
out other than as shareholders and management expected;6 nor will
claims succeed based upon “flawed process.”7
Allegations of waste must overcome difficult pleading standards.
“The pleading burden on a plaintiff attacking a corporate transaction as
wasteful is necessarily higher than that of a plaintiff challenging a transaction as ‘unfair’ as a result of the directors’ conflicted loyalties or lack
of due care.”8 For example, the court dismissed a claim where the plaintiff challenged a merger but failed to plead facts supporting the “conclusion that no rational person could regard the merger as sensible.”9 Further, shareholders could not plead a claim of waste simply by presenting
facts indicating that compensation agreements were “generous (and, perhaps excessively so).”10 Additionally, courts do not permit waste claims
where other standards are more applicable.11
Early cases arose from efforts to assert that sufficient process could
defeat a claim for waste. Boards sought to defend allegations by asserting
that the challenged behavior had been approved by shareholders. The
2. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty without Limits: “Independent” Directors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 57 (2006-07). (Any residual content to the duty of care
was eliminated with the universal adoption of waiver of liability provisions)
3. See Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 669 (Del. Ch. 2007); (“Conceived more realistically, the doctrine of waste is a residual protection for stockholders that polices the outer boundaries of
the broad field of discretion afforded directors by the business judgment rule.”); see also Steven C.
Caywood, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can Provide a Viable Solution
in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 111, 115 (2010) (‘The corporate waste doctrine has been described as an ‘equitable safety valve,’ meaning that it can be used for
cases where relief would be otherwise unavailable.”).
4. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000).
5. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (emphasis in original).
6. See Ash v. McCall, No. Civ.A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000)
(”The fact that the merger turned out badly or, indeed, abominably for McKesson simply does not
and cannot mean that approval of the merger was an act of corporate waste at the time the McKesson
board entered into it.”).
7. In general, such a claim must be “properly brought” as a claim for breach of the duty of
care.” In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., 2009 WL 3206051, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009).
8. Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892 (Del. Ch. 1999).
9. Id.
10. TVI Corp. v. Gallagher, C.A. No. 7798-VCP, 2013 WL 5809271, at *17 (Del. Ch. October 28, 2013).
11. See Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, C.A. No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at *35
(Del. Ch. July 12, 2010) (concluding waste claim should be dismissed because the essence of the
violation was really a breach of the duty of loyalty by knowingly permitting an illegal practice and
not corporate waste).
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courts, however, found that process in the form of shareholder ratification would not protect a board from allegations of waste. “An unconscionable deal between directors personally and the corporation they
represent could not become conscionable merely because most of the
stockholders were either indifferent or actually in sympathy with the
directors’ scheme.”12 Proper process provided legal benefits but did not
eliminate the claim.13
Nonetheless, these early cases set a high bar for the application of
waste. Courts viewed themselves as ill equipped to determine “the relationship of the value received by the corporation to the benefit bestowed.”14 As a result, value or benefit was primarily “a matter of judgment on the part of the person who must pay for them” and required deference “to decisions of directors and stockholders.”15 Nonetheless, payments may grow “so disproportionately large as to be unconscionable
and constitute waste.”16
III. WASTE AND CORPORATE BENEFIT
Waste can arise where the corporation received no benefit in a
transaction. In those circumstances, any payment is excessive. Courts
have addressed the issue in the context of past consideration, the failure
to maximize tax benefits in a transaction, and benefits arising from the
inclusion of standard provisions in severance contracts.
A. Past Consideration
Early cases presumed that companies did not benefit from past consideration “since the amount of the salary to the executive had been fixed
by previous agreement and the services had been performed.”17 Early
exceptions, however, developed. Past consideration sufficed for payments made “pursuant to an implied contract” and “amounts awarded
that were not unreasonable in view of the services rendered.”18 As the
court concluded in Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corporation:
“[T]he services rendered by the executive were unusual in character and
extraordinary, from which the corporation received great gains and prof-

12. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 665 (Del. 1952).
13. Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962) (clarifying that disinterested shareholder approval shifted burden to shareholders “to convince the court that no person of ordinary, sound
business judgment would be expected to entertain the view that the consideration was a fair exchange for the value which was given.”).
14. Id. at 610.
15. Id.
16. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009).
17. Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 64 A.2d 581, 606 (Del. 1948).
18. Id. at 588-89 (citing Osborne v. United Gas Improvement Co., 46 A.2d 208, 211 (PA
1946).
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its; therefore, the retroactive feature of the executive’s increases in salary
. . . were proper under the second exception as noted above.”19
In Zupnick v. Goizueta,20 shareholders challenged an award of options to the CEO of Coca Cola on the basis of past performance.21 Under
the leadership of the CEO, the company gained $69 billion in market
value.22 The court cited to the exception in Blish and upheld the award
because of the “remarkable increase in market value” of Coca Cola during the CEO’s tenor.23
More recent cases, however, have largely eliminated any limits on
the use of past consideration to justify additional compensation. Extraordinary efforts are no longer necessary. In Zucker v. Andreessen, 24 the
departing CEO received a severance package valued at $40 million or
more.25 The board in part justified the amount on the basis of past performance.26 Rather than show dramatic growth, however, the facts
showed an absence of “significant loss.”27 The court found this sufficient
to defeat a claim for waste.28
Courts have acknowledged other benefits that can justify payments
on the basis of past consideration. Such payments may encourage an
employee to continue his or her employment. Severance, even if not legally required, “may serve as a signal to current and future employees
that they, too, might receive extra compensation at the end of their tenure
if they successfully serve their term.”29 The payments may also ensure “a
smooth and harmonious transfer of power, securing a good relationship
with the retiring employee, preventing future embarrassing disclosure
and lawsuits.”30 Indeed, the failure to pay severance may “undermine[]
efforts to attract outside executive talent.”31
19. Blish, 64 A.2d at 606 (concluding services were extraordinary “largely because of [the
CEO’s] business acumen and constant efforts” which “sprung [the company] from the steps of
poverty to a successful and internationally known arms corporation” in just two and one-half years
with $11,000,000 in net profits).
20. Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384 (Del. Ch.1997).
21. Id. at 385.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 388.
24. Zucker v. Andreessen, C.A. No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 21,
2012).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Id. at *9 (“Plaintiff does not allege that the Company suffered significant losses during
[the CEO’s] tenure as CEO or that he otherwise was an ineffectual executive,” and finding that
under these circumstances “at least some portion of [the CEO’s] severance could represent ‘reasonable’ compensation for his successful past performance.”).
28. Id. at *10 (justifying dismissal of waste action not just because of the past performance
but also because of the contractual releases the CEO provided to the coming as part of his severance
agreement).
29. Seinfeld v. Slager, Civil Action No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *6 (Del. Ch. June
29, 2012).
30. Id.
31. Zucker, 2012 WL 2366448, at *9.
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B. Tax Benefits
Boards have “no general fiduciary duty to minimize taxes.”32 Delaware courts therefore reject allegations of waste based upon such claims
at least where boards have a business justification for the transaction at
issue.33
In Haber v. Bell,34 the plaintiffs alleged waste when the company
altered a benefit plan following changes in the law.35 The amendments
resulted in the loss of tax deductions for employee stock options. To
sustain a claim for waste, the court found that plaintiffs needed to show
that the board lacked the authority to adopt the amendments or “that the
options [were] of such gross disparity of consideration as to make Board
approval appear to be of the type no reasonable businessman could approve.”36 Having failed to make the requisite showing, the court dismissed the claim.37
Similarly, courts will not sanction a board for failing to obtain tax
benefits where doing so results in the loss of flexibility in awarding compensation. In Freedman v. Adams,38 the plaintiff asserted that “by failing
to structure the cash bonuses as tax-deductible compensation,” the board
cost the company “tens of millions of dollars ” under Section 162(m) of
the IRC.39 That provision limited the deductibility of cash bonuses above
$1 million to those structured as “performance-based compensation.”40
By failing to qualify under the provision, the company, shareholders alleged, effectively “gave a gift to the federal government for which it received no consideration.”41
The court noted that the failure to qualify under the provision was
designed to avoid being “constrained” in awarding compensation and
provide increased flexibility. “The Board believed that it received consideration for forgoing the tax deductions, namely, the flexibility to set
executive compensation without any constraints imposed by a § 162(m)
plan.”42 Such a justification defeated the claim for waste.

32. Seinfeld, 2012 WL 2501105, at *3 (citing Freedman v. Adams, C.A. No. 4199-VCN, 2012
WL 1345638, at *12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2012).
33. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 169 (Del. Ch. 2014) (in challenge to whether there was any corporate benefit to the non-deferral of interest on debt notes, court
allowed the waste claim to proceed citing to the complaint that “the Board could have charted a
course that would result in the Company never having to pay anything”).
34. Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353 (Del. Ch. 1983).
35. Id. at 359.
36. Id. (citing Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602 (1962)).
37. Id.
38. Freedman v. Adams, C.A. No. 4199-VCN, 2012 WL 1345638, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30,
2012).
39. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2012).
40. Id.
41. Freedman, 2012 WL 1345638, at *14.
42. Id.
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One case did find that the failure to obtain tax benefits under Section 162(m) could result in waste. In Resnik v. Woertz,43 the company
allegedly failed to reapprove a compensation plan in a timely fashion
and, as a result, could not deduct payments under Section 162(m).44 The
complaint alleged that the plan allowed for payments of up to
$90,250,000.00 per board member.45 As a result, the inability to deduct
payments under the plan could result in “substantial and avoidable tax
liability.”46 The court found that “no person of ordinary sound judgment
could view the benefits received in the transaction as a fair exchange for
the consideration paid by ADM.”47
In general, therefore, the failure to maximize tax benefits will not
constitute waste, at least where the underlying transaction has a business
purpose. Resnik amounts to an exception. One court, however, explained
away the decision by emphasizing both the magnitude of the lost tax
deductions and that the “compensation plan at issue [in Resnick] . . . introduced elements of excessive compensation, director interestedness,
and a lack of candor not present in the instant case.”48
C. Contractual Benefits
Courts have also found benefit in the form of routine provisions that
appear in severance agreements. These include extensions of the period
of confidentiality for information possessed by the departing officer,
non-disparagement clauses, and obligations to cooperate. Similarly, releases from liability constitute benefit.
In Zucker v. Andreessen,49 the board approved a severance agreement in part based upon the officer’s willingness to agree to a release
from liability against the company.50 Plaintiffs alleged that the release
had little value since the company had grounds to terminate the official
for cause.51 The court, however, disagreed, finding that the company
benefited from the execution of the waiver.52 The officer may not have
acquiesced to “for cause” dismissal and “[c]reative counsel advocating
on [the officer’s] behalf could have claimed that he, in fact, was entitled

43. Resnik v. Woertz, 774 F. Supp. 2d 614 (D.C. Del. 2011).
44. Id. at 619.
45. Id. at 633.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Freedman, 2012 WL 1345638, at *15. Courts have also been less likely to find waste
where a transaction eliminated a corporate benefit that was speculative. See In re Limited, Inc., No.
Civ.A. 17148-NC, 2002 WL 537692, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002).
49. Zucker v. Andreessen, C.A. No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2012)
50. Id. at *3.
51. Id., 2012 WL 2366448, at *8 (alleging that “the Board could have avoided paying [CEO]
severance under the Company's general executive officer severance policy by terminating him for
Cause.”)
52. Id.
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to severance under [the company’s] general executive officer severance
plan notwithstanding the expense report violations.”53
The court took a different view of the value of standard contract
terms in In re Citigroup.54 Shareholders filed a derivative action alleging
that the directors engaged in waste by approving a severance package for
the retiring CEO.55 The CEO would “receive $68 million upon his departure from Citigroup, including bonus, salary, and accumulated stockholdings.56 The agreement also provided that the CEO would receive “an
office, an administrative assistant, and a car and drive for the lesser of
five years or until he commences full time employment with another
employer.”57
The letter agreement memorializing the package “contemplated that
[the CEO] would sign a non-compete agreement, a non-disparagement
agreement, a non-solicitation agreement, and a release of claims against
the Company.”58 The court held that the presence of these provisions
were not enough to warrant dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims.59 “Without
more information . . . there is reasonable doubt as to whether the letter
agreement meets the admittedly stringent ‘so one sided’ standard or
whether the letter agreement awarded compensation that is beyond the
‘outer limit’ described by the Delaware Supreme Court.”60
In one case, shareholders argued that the structure of a contract resulted in waste. In Brehm v. Eisner,61 the plaintiff brought a derivative
suit alleging that the Board committed waste by entering into an employment agreement that “was structured to ‘incentivize’ [the officer] to
seek an early non-fault termination.”62 The contract did so by providing
for greater compensation the earlier the officer departed.63 The court,
however, emphasized that “the size and structure of executive compensation are inherently maters of judgment.”64 The fact that the agreement
paid the officer more for early dismissal was of no consequence in determining waste because “the former Board determined that in order to
attract [the officer] to Disney, Disney would have to offer him a highly
53. Id. at *8 (noting that general releases also avoided the possible costs the company would
need to incur to defend any claim including “considerable costs of time, resources, and negative
publicity in the interim”).
54. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
55. Id. at 110.
56. Id. at 138.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 137.
61. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
62. Id. at 263.
63. Essentially, “the contract gave Ovitz an incentive to find a way to exit the Company via a
non-fault termination as soon as possible because doing so would permit him to earn more than he
could by fulfilling his contract.” Id. at 251.
64. Id. at 263.
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attractive compensation package.”65 In return, the officer left his current
position as chairman of another company.66
Ordinary contract provisions can, therefore, provide a corporation
with benefit. The court in Citibank, however, indicated that these provisions may not always be sufficient to justify substantial payments.67 Indeed, one commentator suggested that the case “may weaken the heavy
burden imposed by Brehm” and “open the door for a successful shareholder claim of excessive executive compensation.”68
D. Conclusion
When confronting claims of waste, courts analyze what benefit the
company received from the challenged transaction. Courts impose a
highly deferential standard in determining whether a corporation has
received something of benefit.
IV. WASTE AND EXCESSIVE PAYMENT
Claims for waste may also occur where the company makes payments disproportionate to the benefit received. These allegations arise
most often in the context of executive compensation, overpayment for
services, and sale of undervalued assets. Waste can also occur through
the payment of an excessive price in an acquisition of another company.69 Given the presence of a benefit, courts rarely second-guess whether
the amount paid was excessive and routinely defer to the judgment of the
board.
A. Vendor Payments
Allegations of waste have arisen with respect to the amount paid to
consultants or other advisors. In Highland Legacy Ltd. v. Singer,70 a
stockholder “alleged that the directors committed corporate waste by
paying exorbitant fees and warrants” to two financial advisory firms.71
The challenged services involved the payment of $3 million for consultation on financial and restructuring matters following the company’s
65. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A. 2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998) (reversed on
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)).
66. Id. (“In exchange for providing [the officer] the compensation package under the terms of
the Employment Agreement, [the officer] agreed to leave his position as chairman of CAA to become president of Disney.”).
67. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009).
68. Steven C. Caywood, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine can
Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV.
111, 119 (2010).
69. In re Nat’l Auto Credit, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2003 WL 139768 at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10,
2003) (noting acquisition “raised serious eyebrows” because of “the sheer magnitude of the purchase
price” and the open question as to “whether [the company] was purchasing anything, other than a
shelter” for the CEO).
70. Highland Legacy Ltd. v. Singer, No. Civ.A. 1566-N, 2006 WL 741939 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17,
2006).
71. Id. at *1.
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emergence from bankruptcy.72 In addition, the consultant received “warrants to purchase hundreds of thousand of shares” allegedly worth tens of
millions of dollars.73 The court held that the waste claim fell “far short of
meeting the stringent requirements of the waste test.”74
Similarly, an increase in payments from $50,000 to $100,000 per
month between the company and a consultant did not constitute waste
even when coupled with allegations that the same parties controlled both
entities.75 A “shared expenses fee,” the amount was paid as compensation for “overhead expenses,” including “rent, utilities, insurance, employee benefits, and the salaries of employees”.76 The court concluded
that a reasonable person would find that the company received “adequate
consideration” for the payments.”77
The court also dismissed a claim for waste alleging overpayment to
vendors for services in Zutrau v. Jansing.78 There, the plaintiff alleged
that the CEO authorized transactions in which the company overpaid one
vendor by $9,000 and another by $57,000.79 The court noted that, to sustain a claim for waste, a plaintiff “must show that virtually no consideration was received in the relevant exchange.”80 Moreover, the burden
would not be met merely by “compar[ing] the amounts . . . charged during [the plaintiff’s] tenure at [the company] with what [the company]
charged in later years.” 81 With respect to one of the increases, the CEO
offered “undisputed testimony that [the company] needed to increase the
services . . . to meet competition” from another company.82
Not all claims for waste involving vendors have, however, failed. In
Quadrant Structured Products,83 the court allowed a claim to proceed
that challenged fees paid under a services agreement and software license.84 Shareholders alleged that, after a change in control, the services
72. Id. at *2.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *7. (holding waste claim failed where “[t]he complaint merely alleges that the firms
were overcompensated” and the complaint “does not alleged that [the financial advisory firms] were
hired for other than a legitimate business purpose or that they failed to perform tasks for which they
were retained.”)
75. Kates v. Beard Research, Inc., Civil Action No. 1480-VCP, 2010 WL 1644176, at *1
(Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 2010).
76. Id. at *2.
77. Id. (holding waste claim not sufficiently alleged where increase in fee for overhead expense was associated with the business growing “from four to twelve” employees and then from
twelve to sixteen employees during the relevant period).
78. Zutrau v. Jansing, C.A. No. 7457-VCP, 2014 WL 3772859 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2014).
79. Id. at *21.
80. Id.
81. Id. (noting plaintiff merely “compared the amounts that [the] company charged during her
tenure ...with what it charged in later years” which was insufficient evidence of waste where defendant “offered undisputed testimony that [the company] need to increase the services it obtained from
vendors”.)
82. Id.
83. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155 (Del. Ch. 2014).
84. Id. at 193.
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provided under the services agreement “substantially diminished” and, as
a result, the “fees should have decreased.”85 Shareholders, however, asserted that instead the fees “climbed dramatically and far exceeded market rates.”86 Recognizing that “excessive fees could fall so far beyond
market standards as to amount to waste,” the court found that “while that
seems improbable, it is reasonably conceivable.”87
B. Compensation Payments
Generous compensation packages will generally not constitute
waste. As one court noted, “amount alone is not the most salient aspect”
when determining waste.88 The courts have therefore upheld the grant of
stock options worth tens of millions of dollars,89 a cash bonus of $1.8
million,90 and a severance payment of $40 million.91 The court has
acknowledged that waste will not occur even when the severance appeared “extremely rich or altogether distasteful” so long as approved by
“disinterested and independent” directors.92
Nor will the court necessarily find waste even when the evidence
suggests that the payments exceeded those of peer companies. In Cambridge Retirement System v. Bosnjak, 93 plaintiffs alleged waste where the
company paid compensation equivalent to 25% of the company’s yearly
revenue.94 The complaint alleged that this compensation exceeded payments by eleven other companies in the same industry and with similar
market capitalizations.95 The court did not, however, find the evidence
compelling and dismissed the claim for waste.96
The court did allow a case of waste involving benefits to the CEO to
go forward in In re INFOUSA.97 There, shareholders challenged a variety
of expenditures alleged to have benefited the CEO.98 These “included the
85. Id.
86. Id. at 169 (noting fees increased from $14 million in 2009 to $23.5 million in 2010).
87. Id. at 193.
88. Zucker v. Andreessen, C.A. No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448, at *10 (Del. Ch. June 21,
2012).
89. Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 385 (Del. Ch.1997) (noting the Board awarded the
Coca-Cola CEO options to purchase one million shares of the corporation’s stock exercisable ten
years from the issuance date which was April 19th, 1995).
90. Seinfeld v. Slager, Civil Action No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *7 (Del. Ch. June
29, 2012)
91. Zucker, 2012 WL 2366448, at *10.
92. Id.
93. Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Bosnjak, C.A. No. 9178-CB, 2014 WL 2930869 (Del. Ch. June
26, 2014).
94. Id. at *3.
95. Id. at *10.
96. Id. (noting that allegations the compensation was excessive relative to other similar
healthcare companies “raise questions concerning the fairness of the outside directors’ compensation,” but do not “rise to the level necessary to establish a complete failure of consideration or that
the director defendants authorized an exchange that was so one-sided that no reasonable business
person could conclude” that adequate consideration was received.).
97. In re INFOUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2007).
98. Id. at 971.
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lease of aircraft and office space for personal use, the provision of a
yacht, and a collection of luxury and collectible cares that would leave
James Bond green with envy.”99 In allowing the case to go forward, the
court relied on one instance where the shareholders alleged payments
that appeared to provide little or no benefit to the corporation.100
Substantial payments to a CEO can also meet the requirements of
waste, at least where accompanied by allegations that the payments represented compensation for the CEO’s leadership of a “passive corporation.”101 In In re National Auto Credit, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the
plaintiffs alleged that the board committed waste when the board adopted
an employment agreement for the CEO.102 The court refused to dismiss
the waste claims.103 In analyzing the compensation, the court noted “[i]t
is not the mere allegation that [the CEO] is being compensated some
threshold amount that permits the Plaintiffs’ waste claim to proceed;
instead, it is that [the CEO] is being paid a large sum of money to be the
head of what essentially is a passive corporation.”104
Courts will also provide careful scrutiny of compensation packages
that have the potential to entrench management but otherwise provide the
company with little benefit. In Sample v. Morgan,105 plaintiffs alleged
that defendants received “nearly a third of the company’s voting power”
and had “their taxes paid for them by the company, which had to go into
debt in order to bestow that beneficence.”106 At the same time, the company apparently received little benefit as a result of the arrangement. As
the court noted: “[T]he company got the three executives to stay without
any indication that the three had offers to go elsewhere.” 107 In rejecting
the motion to dismiss, the court stated “[i]f giving away nearly a third of
the voting and cash flow rights of a public company for $200 in order to
retain managers who ardently desired to become firmly entrenched just
where they were does not raise a pleading stage inference of waste, it is
difficult to imagine what would.”108

99. Id.
100. As one example, shareholders alleged that the company purchased a skybox at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Football Stadium from the CEO, which failed to discount the asset to
reflect “the value of tickets that mature at the same the same time that a baby born at the time of the
transaction would be legally able to buy beer from a stadium vendor.” Id. at 1002. The court proclaimed, “[a] reasonable person might well consider this a sweetheart deal for [the CEO],” but that
adequate consideration lacked. Id.
101. In re Nat’l Auto Credit, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 19028, 2003 WL 139768, at *14
(Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2003).
102. Id. at *6.
103. Id. at *13–14.
104. Id. at *14,
105. Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 2007).
106. Id. at 670.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 652.
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V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This section examines the reported cases addressing waste.109 The
analysis shows that waste claims are infrequent. Since 2000, Delaware
has decided 52 waste cases.110 Executive compensation and overpayment
for services dominate these cases. Most cases for waste (29) involve
allegations of payment amount beyond acceptable market standards. Significant payments alone will not be enough. Instead, they must be coupled with other factors such as a decline in responsibilities associated
with the payments.
Only ten cases survived a motion to dismiss.111 Most involved allegations of excessive compensation. Courts may find waste where there
is some evidence of a possible conflict of interest. For example, in Telxon v. Bogomolny and In re National Auto Credit, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged both waste and duty of loyalty violations, which the court did not
dismiss.112 Further, In Seinfeld v. Coker, the board allegedly made payments of $300,000 to directors of an acquired company for no consideration.113 It appears that waste is best brought when the conduct appears
egregious enough to trigger a violation of fiduciary duty along with
waste.
An action of waste is difficult to sustain given the “no ordinary
business person” standard. More recent cases, however, may suggest a
shift in the approach. The court in Quadrant Structured Products Co.
Ltd v. Vertin allowed the case to go forward based upon a challenged to
the structure of the transaction. 114 The court agreed that a claim for
waste was made where “the board could have charted a course” that
would result in the company deferring certain interest payments.115 In
addition, the court agreed that a claim for waste was stated as a result of
allegations that certain fees exceeded market standards. In dealing with
executive compensation, the court recently took a position that also indicates liberalization in application. In the recent past, boards authorized
substantial compensation based upon such benefits certain contractual
releases from liability. In re Citigroup116, however, may signal a reduced
patience with this approach. Despite the broad language in Zucker v.

109. See infra Appendix B.
110. In determining the number of waste cases, I used a number of keyword searches in
WestlawNext including such phrases as “corporate waste,” and “ATLEAST(4)(waste)” to generate
an exhaustive list of waste cases. To verify the list of cases I ran additional searches that included
“waste” and key terms often found such as “fiduciary duty.”
111. See infra Appendix A.
112. See Telxon Corp. v. Bogomolny, 792 A.2d 964, 974-76 (Del. Ch. 2001); In re Nat’l Auto
Credit, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 19028, 2003 WL 139768, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2003).
113. See Seinfeld v. Coker, 847 A.2d 330, 331 (Del. Ch. 2000).
114. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., LTD. v Vertin, 102 A.3d 193 (Del. Ch. 2014).
115. Id.
116. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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Andreessen117, the Citigroup court indicated that the same basic contractual terms in a severance agreement used in Zucker, which formed the
basis of the court’s reasoning to dismiss the waste claim, did not automatically justify the dismissal of a claim for waste in Citigroup.118

117.
2012).
118.

Zucker v. Andreessen, C.A. No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 21,
Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 137.
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APPENDIX A:WASTE CASES SINCE 2000 NOT DISMISSED ON A MOTION
TO DISMISS
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